Distanced from the policy makers, atrocities such as the use of excessive force against combatants and non-combatants as well as improper behavior against detainees by the US military has further added to the growing “black-eye” of American. I am not a soldier but I know that all US military personnel have some training regarding the rules of war and specific rules of engagement. So, despite training, some
What policy changes can decrease atrocities in conflict situations?
Based on class lectures, several readings, and the film Ghosts of Abu Ghraib, I propose the following changes that may or may not directly impact
One – Roll-back the DoD memorandum signed by Donald Rumsfeld that effectively granted permission to use creative ways to “interrogate” detainees.
While the memo does not specifically grant permission to torture detainees, it created a feeling or “do whatever it takes” throughout the US military. This assertion is backed by several statements of military personnel at
Two – Improve communication through every level of the Armed Services, specifically changes in military policy and the rules of engagement.
One of the problems noted by several of the personnel that committed atrocities in
Three – Clearly define acceptable and unacceptable means of aggressive interrogation.
As evident in the Rumsfeld memo, some activities are clearly defined and noted as “acceptable” but the other proposed strategies are not outright condemned. This leaves some uncertainty in the minds of those on the ground. Furthermore, the comments from the DoD seem to suggest that more aggressive interrogation that violates the Geneva Conventions may be used at some point.
Four – Maintain the organizational expertise structure of specific military commands or create new commands with proper training to effectively complete the mission.
One of the major problems with Abu Ghraib may have stemmed from the fact that the guards were actually Marine MPs, not correction officers. Trained for combat, the group was thrown off-guard when they arrived at the prison and were told to put away their weapons. Also, the organizational structure was changed; the MPs began reporting to military intelligence and civilian intelligence personnel rather than their designated superior, General Karpinski. Essentially, there was “mission creep” within the MPs stationed at Abu Ghraib.
2 comments:
At the end of your post, you sort of hint at something that I think was actually a big problem at Abu Ghraib, and that's the mixing of different agencies/chains of command within the military. I can't explain why, but I feel that mixing the groups that have authority over a soldier might be a bad idea. Different sections of the military will have different rules, and it seems that placing, for example, military intelligence over MPs is a bad idea, likely to lead to confusion at the very least.
I was thinking something along the same lines, Mercedes. What was really, really horrifying to hear one of the soldiers say in the Ghosts of Abu Ghraib documentary was when he said something along the lines of "we were just told one day that we were going to be guards at a prison...the day before I was shooting a gun out of a helicopter while we were flying out of the desert and now I'm going to be a prison guard?" Is that normal for soldiers to be assigned things that they aren't really trained to do? Maybe that's where the problem lies... and we can get confirmation of that by looking at the Stanford Prison Experiment... the people who were guards weren't trained for that kinda stuff and look how they ended up acting. Ugh.
Post a Comment